• The all-pay auction with cross-shareholdings 

      Clark, Derek J.; Konrad, Kai A.; Riis, Christian (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2007-02)
      We consider an all-pay auction between several firms under asymmetric information in which each firm owns a share in its rival. We characterize the equilibrium and show how much these cross-shareholdings serve to dampen competition. Additionally, we explain why the well known relationship between the equilibrium strategies of the standard first price and all-pay auctions breaks down in our setting.
    • Fragmented property rights, R & D and market structure 

      Konrad, Kai A.; Clark, Derek J. (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2005-04)
      Fragmented property rights can be a factor that limits firms’ willingness to invest in the development and commercialization of new products. This paper studies the interaction between markets for products and markets for intellectual property rights (patents) where product innovation requires several complementary patents, each of which is obtained as the result of a patent race. We show that ...
    • Tournaments with multi-tasking 

      Clark, Derek J.; Konrad, Kai A. (Working paper; Arbeidsnotat, 2005-08)
      The standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension is well understood and documented. In this paper we propose an extension in which competition ensues in several dimensions and a competitor that wins a certain number of these is awarded a prize. We look at the design of this contest from the point of view of maximizing effort in the contest (per dimension and totally), ...